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A COMPARATIVE TEST OF THE PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM THEORY: 
POLICY PUNCTUATIONS IN TOBACCO CONTROL 1 
Shortened Title: A Comparative Test of the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory 
Bio: Matia Vannoni (PhD, UCL) is currently a postdoctoral researcher at the Innocenzo Gasparini 
Institute for Economic Research (IGIER), Bocconi University. His research has featured in several 
journals, such as Policy Studies Journal, and Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory. 
Abstract: Tobacco control plays a central role in the development of the punctuated equilibrium 
theory. The proponents of this theory posit that this policy, like many others, develop through 
punctuations, namely the combination of periods of policy inertia, due to negative feedback 
effects, and drastic policy change, due to positive feedback effects. Yet, little has been done to 
empirically test this claim. By relying on a unique dataset of policy changes in tobacco taxation 
and regulation across multiple countries over the last decades, I test the punctuation hypothesis in 
tobacco control. Findings show that tobacco control evolves through long periods of policy inertia, 
followed by short periods of drastic change, namely punctuations, thus providing further support 
for the punctuated equilibrium theory. This article presents the first large-N test of the punctuated 
equilibrium theory on tobacco control. 
Key-words: tobacco control, punctuations, punctuated equilibrium theory, comparative public 
policy 
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INTRODUCTION 
The proponents of the punctuated equilibrium theory argue that tobacco control develops through 
periods of negative feedback effects, where the low public attention and the monopoly of a few 
stakeholders prevent any policy change, and periods of positive feedback effects, where public 
attention increases and makes policy change possible. Until the 1980s, smoking received little 
public attention in the US. This led to the creation of a policy-subsystem controlled by the tobacco 
industry, triggering negative feedback effects and preventing any change. In the 1990s, strong 
medical evidence against the harmful effects of smoking moved this issue to the center of the 
public attention, empowering legislators to take strong action. 
Despite the great attention of the public policy literature on tobacco control, little has been done 
to empirically test these claims. This article seeks to fill in this gap, by testing whether tobacco 
control is characterised by positive and negative feedback effects. I do so by looking at the 
empirically observable implications of these effects. More specifically, I test whether tobacco 
control is characterised by punctuations, namely the combination of drastic policy changes, related 
to positive feedback effects, and incremental changes, which suggest the presence of negative 
feedback effects. The article relies on a unique dataset of policy change in tobacco taxation and 
regulation across multiple countries over the last decades. In line with the common practice in the 
public policy literature, I use frequency distributions of percentage change to test the punctuation 
hypothesis. Findings suggest that tobacco control is characterised by punctuations, thus providing 
further support for the punctuated equilibrium theory. 
The paper develops as follows. I commence by emphasizing the importance of tobacco control in 
the punctuated equilibrium theory. I proceed by discussing how public policy scholars conceive 
punctuations as the empirically observable implications of the positive and negative feedback 
effects in public policy and which methods they use to measure punctuations. In the ensuing 
sections, I apply these methods to tobacco control and provide evidence for the presence of 
punctuations in tobacco control. This work concludes by discussing the implications of this finding 
for the punctuated equilibrium theory. 
TOBACCO CONTROL IN THE PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM THEORY 
Tobacco control is studied from a punctuated equilibrium theory perspective by the proponents of 
this theory themselves (Baumgartner and Jones 2009, 1993) and in successive work (Givel, 2006, 
Cairney 2007, Cairney, Studlar, and Mamudu 2012). The introduction of smoking bans across the 
US is associated with the increasingly negative attention to this issue. In the aftermath of WWII 
the low public attention to smoking (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 91-94) and the relatively 
positive tone with which this issue was discussed led to the creation of a policy subsystem based 
on the dominance of the tobacco industry, triggering negative feedback effects, which in turn 
prevented any substantial change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 91-92). Nonetheless, several 
factors, such as the diffusion of medical evidence on the harmful effects of smoking, led to an 
increasingly negative tone in the public attention to this issue (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 91). 
This increasingly negative public attention contributed to create an increasingly negative political 
attention (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 94, 116) and eventually the dismantling of the 
predominant policy network led by the tobacco industry: what are called positive feedback effects. 
2  
The proponents of the punctuated equilibrium theory conceive policy change in tobacco control as 
characterized by periods of negative feedback effects, characterised by the monopoly exercised by 
                                                          
2 The use of the concepts of negative and positive feedback effects is common practice in the literature on public policy. The former 
refer to those mechanisms which prevent change and perpetuate the same dynamics over time, while the latter refer to those 
mechanisms which trigger change. 
the incumbent policy network in policy-making, and periods of positive feedback effects, 
associated with the access of a new issue (or a new framing of an old issue) to the political agenda, 
sustained by a new coalition of policy actors. The terms used for the two types of mobilization, 
associated respectively with negative and positive feedback effects, are Downsian and 
Schattschneider. Downsian mobilization is associated with the establishment of a new policy 
subsystem (or policy network), whereas Schattschneider mobilization refers to the destruction of 
the policy subsystem in place (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 97-100). 3 
Despite the great attention of the public policy literature on tobacco control, little has been done 
to empirically test the claims above. This work seeks to fill in this gap, by testing the presence of 
punctuations, namely the empirically observable implications of positive and negative feedback 
effects, in tobacco control. The ensuing section introduces the concept of punctuations in public 
policy and the policy dynamics underlying them. 
PUNCTUATIONS IN PUBLIC POLICY 
Some ideational approaches to public policy, namely those focused on the diffusion of ideas and 
how decision-makers receive these ideas, suggest that policies evolve through periods of drastic 
changes, because ideas spread fast across countries and decision-makers can only focus on a few 
things at a time (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 104). Studies of agenda setting point to the cognitive 
limitations of decision-makers as the one of the main explanations for how policies evolve. 4 
Several cognitive phenomena, such as the so-called bottleneck attention effect (Simon 1985, 302), 
                                                          
3 The proponents of the punctuated equilibrium theory acknowledge that several dynamics underlie the process through which an 
issue enters the political agenda, such as venue shopping and strategic re-framing (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 95-96). In other 
words, actors in favour or against a particular issue can strategically choose to address the most like-minded political venue and/or 
change how an issue is framed to make that issue more acceptable for certain decision-makers.  
4 It should be noted that not all ideational approaches focus on the cognitive limitations of decision-makers and on drastic policy 
change. 
explain why rationally bounded individuals’ attention is limited and selective, namely why 
individuals pay attention only to a few issues at a time and for short periods. Such cognitive 
dynamics are replicated at macro level (Baumgartner and Jones 2009, 25). The result is that 
policies evolve through short periods of drastic positive change, in occasion of increases in 
political attention, followed by short periods of drastic negative change, in occasion of decreases 
in political attention. 
Assume an individual who takes decisions by balancing out different sources of information. In so 
doing, he/she combines different indicators into an index, taking decisions based on that index 
(Jones and Baumgartner 2005). If I observe this process for long enough, I will see that policy 
change is incremental. The reason is that by combining different indicators, in turn based on 
different social and political processes, the idiosyncratic processes behind each one of these 
processes should cancel each other out (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, 155). 5 Yet, decision-makers 
do not balance different information sources out, but focus only on some sources, because they do 
not have time and resources, because some sources are more in line with their priors and so on 
(Jones and Baumgartner 2005, 155-156). The result will be policy commitment jumping from an 
issue to another, resulting in a combination of strong positive changes followed by strong negative 
ones. 
Conversely, policy network approaches elicit different implications for policy dynamics. 6 Policies 
are conceived as evolving through long periods of incremental change, mainly due to the action of 
societal actors in the form of policy subsystems. Indeed, only a few actors usually care about an 
                                                          
5 This holds true regardless of the distribution of the single processes, if and only if these distributions are independent from one 
another. Yet, this assumption can be relaxed in this study, as discussed below. 
6 Different policy network approaches are present (Rhodes 2006). In this work, I focus on the strand which refers to issue networks 
(Heclo 1977), iron triangles (Maass 1951), epistemic communities (Haas 1992), policy communities (Richardson and Jordan 1979) 
and so on. The reason is that in this work I am interested in studying how different actors affect policy-making, what Rhodes (2006, 
427) calls ‘networks as interest intermediation’. 
issue over time and they tend to monopolise decision-making (Heclo 1977, 47). A few societal 
actors have a stake in the same issue over time and tend to monopolise decision-making in that 
issue, by creating strong links with decision-makers. The results are small adjustments from the 
status quo or policy inertia. Also the regulation strand of the public policy literature focuses on 
incrementalism as the result of the way in which decision-makers muddle through, by balancing 
out different perspectives from different interests in the society (Lindblom 1959, 174, 1979, 521). 
In conclusion, these approaches conceive policies as evolving through long periods of incremental 
change. 7 
The punctuated equilibrium theory combines these two perspectives. 8 By building on earlier work 
on budget decision-making (Padgett 1980), the punctuated equilibrium theory suggests that 
policies evolve like most natural phenomena, subject to stochastic events (Breunig 2006, 1070-
1071). Long periods of policy inertia, due to negative feedback effects, are punctuated by short 
periods of drastic change, due to positive feedback effects. In normal conditions policy 
subsystems, supported by policy networks of key societal actors, monopolize policy-making and 
oppose any substantial change: what the literature calls negative policy feedback. In this case the 
policy does not evolve or it does so incrementally. Yet, sometimes the diffusion of policies and 
ideas from other systems brings an issue to the political agenda and cognitively bounded 
individuals suddenly shift their attention to this issue. In these rare occasions the policy is subject 
                                                          
7 Different mechanisms are at the basis of the policy dynamics discussed above. The politics of attention strand of the punctuated 
equilibrium theory (Jones and Baumgartner 2005) focuses exclusively on the cognitive mechanisms which drive information 
processing and hence decision-making. Instead, the original punctuated equilibrium theory grants a role also to policy network 
dynamics which drive negative feedback effects. 
8 Other two public policy theories synthesize these two perspectives: the advocacy coalition framework and the multiple stream 
approach (John 2003, 487). The multiple stream approach focuses on how policy change is triggered by the combination of different 
favorable conditions, such as the shift of competences to a ministry more open to certain ideas and the mobilization of like-minded 
societal actors (Kingdon, 1995; Kingdon and Thurber, 2011; Zahariadis, 2003). The advocacy coalition framework emphasizes the 
importance of societal actors in supporting certain ideas and how these ideas affect policy change (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier, 1998; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
to short periods of drastic change. In conclusion, policy dynamics are conceived as composed of 
long periods of inertia punctuated by short periods of drastic change, namely what this approach 
calls punctuations (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 10). 
An important development of the punctuated equilibrium theory, namely the so-called friction 
model (Baumgartner et al. 2009, Jones et al. 2009), studies the effects of institutional frictions on 
policy change, by looking at different types of policy commitment: inputs, such as media attention; 
processes, such as political commitment in the form of parliamentary hearings, laws and so on; 
outputs, such as budget expenditures (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 611). In so doing, the proponents 
of this theory argue that the degree of punctuations is smallest for inputs and highest for outputs, 
because the decision-making process associated with outputs is characterised by more institutional 
frictions (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 613). The main argument is that outputs are the results of long 
and complicated processes which involve different actors, whereas inputs are the results of more 
informal and straightforward processes. 9 
The punctuated equilibrium theory finds extensive evidence for the presence of punctuations in 
public policy. Findings show that budget expenditures in the US (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, 
138) and other countries, such as Denmark (Mortensen 2005, 941, Breunig et al. 2009, 711) and 
the UK (John and Margetts 2003, 421), are characterised by punctuations. Findings are robust also 
in large-N studies including more countries (Baumgartner et al. 2009, Jones et al. 2009) and when 
several types of policy commitment, other than budget outputs, are analysed (Baumgartner et al. 
2009). Moreover, evidence supports the argument of the friction model, according to which 
punctuations are a constant feature of public policy, but they vary according to institutional 
                                                          
9 Recent research focuses also on the mediating role of windows of opportunities (Kwak 2017). 
frictions (Baumgartner et al. 2009). In conclusion, the public policy literature provides robust 
evidence that public policy evolves through a combination of negative and positive feedback 
effects, by testing the presence of punctuations. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
I showed above that punctuations are considered by the public policy literature as the result of a 
series of dynamics typical of public policies, namely the combination of positive feedback effects, 
in turn related to cognitive limitations of decision-makers and policy diffusion, and negative 
feedback effects, due to policy network dynamics. In the sections below, I test whether tobacco 
control is characterised by punctuations, thus suggesting the presence of positive and negative 
feedback effects, as the punctuated equilibrium theory would expect. This section first discusses 
how to empirically study punctuations and the data used in this paper. 
Frequency Distributions 
As acknowledged in John and Margetts (2003, 415), different ways to measure how policies evolve 
are present in the literature. Frequency distributions of annual percentage change represent the 
mainstream approach in the punctuated equilibrium theory (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, 130), 
which in turn builds on classic work on public budget, such as Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 
(1966). In this approach “a policy change is an alteration in the commitment of a government to 
an objective” (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, 141) and researchers pool frequency distributions of 
changes across different policy areas. The use of annual percentage changes allows taking into 
consideration the different scales of the different series pooled together. Although policy 
commitments can take different forms, public spending has been the most studied one (Cairney 
2011, 194). 
The logic is to compare the distribution obtained with a normal one, which is associated with 
incremental policy dynamics. Indeed, in a normal distribution the majority of the observations 
(policy changes in this case) are clustered around the median (or the zero value, if the curve is 
standardized, as it is the case if percentage changes are plotted). If we apply this logic to policy 
change, this means that the majority of changes are close to zero and hence they are considered 
incremental changes. Instead, if policy change follows the punctuation hypothesis, as suggested 
by the punctuated equilibrium theory, the distribution of policy change will be a Pareto or power 
distribution, taking a leptokurtic shape. The latter is characterized by heavy tails, suggesting the 
presence of a few outliers (more than in a normal distribution), which represent rare episodes of 
drastic policy change, and high frequency of median values, which represent recurrent episodes of 
policy inertia. Furthermore, the public policy literature uses the kurtosis of a distribution to 
measure its skewness and hence compare it with the normal distribution, which has kurtosis of 3 
(and L-moments kurtosis of about 0.123). 10 It is also common practice to use statistical tests for 
normality, such as the Skewness/Kurtosis, Shapiro-Wilk W and the Shapiro-Francia W'. 
Another method to test the punctuation hypothesis in policy dynamics is to visualize the 
distribution of percentage in policy change in a log-log plot (with the cumulative frequencies on 
the vertical axis, representing how many observations have a certain degree of change or higher). 
When plotted on a log-log graph a Pareto or power distribution (which in turn is a derivation of an 
exponential distribution) appears as a straight line, because the logarithmic function is the inverse 
function of the exponential function. Instead, in a log-log plot a normal distribution is characterised 
by a downward curvature (John and Margetts 2003, 422-423).  
                                                          
10 Kurtosis calculated with moments is scale-free, more stable and less affected by outliers and as such, is considered a better 
measure by the punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 612). 
This method has also been used by dividing the distribution of policy changes into two different 
sub-distributions, respectively increases and decreases (John and Margetts 2003, 422-423). The 
logic behind this distinction is that positive changes, such as increases in expenditures in a policy 
area, represent the result of positive feedback effects. When an issue suddenly enters the political 
agenda, decision-makers will take action by allocating more resources to it. Conversely, decreases 
in expenditures may not reflect these sudden changes in political attention, as retrenchment is 
inherently more resilient, being subject to dynamics like path dependence. In this vein, we would 
expect the right tail, namely the positive changes, to behave like a power distribution and the left 
tail, namely the negative changes, to behave more like a normal one (Jones et al. 2009, 860-862). 
Data and Measurement 
I test the punctuation hypothesis in tobacco control, by relying on a unique dataset of policy change 
in tobacco taxation and regulation across multiple countries over the last decades. In the 1980s 
tobacco taxation started to be widely used to curb tobacco consumption across advanced 
democratic countries, becoming “a major policy instrument in the past 20–30 years” (Cairney, 
Studlar, and Mamudu 2012, 18). The importance of taxation was formally acknowledged in art.6 
of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, which mentions 
price and tax measures among the most effective means to curb smoking, especially among young 
people. The decision-making behind tobacco taxation is today characterised by the interaction 
between different actors, supporting different and often contrasting interests. Health non-
governmental organizations and the medical community push for higher taxation as a way to curb 
smoking, whereas the tobacco industry warns decision-makers of the negative economic effects of 
tobacco taxation, such as the loss in state revenues and jobs, along with a series of indirect effects, 
such as the increase in illicit trade. In the last decades decision-makers have shifted from 
supporting one position to the other and political attention to the issue has been spasmodic. 
Tobacco control and more specifically tobacco taxation has become a priority for national 
politicians, especially in the occasion of the publication of important medical evidence and when 
more action on smoking was urged by the international community.  
Several issues need to be discussed when using tobacco taxation to measure policy change in 
tobacco control. First, different systems of tobacco taxation are in place across the world, 
characterised by two types of excise duties: ad valorem, which represents a percentage of the price 
of the cigarette packet, and specific, which represents a specific amount per cigarette (WHO 2010, 
28). 11 These excise duties are levied along with the regular Value Added Tax (VAT) and import 
duties. Ad valorem excises arguably represent the most valid and reliable measure to be used in 
annual percentage change distributions. Indeed, this measure allows controlling for inflation and 
different purchasing power across countries and over time, as it is calculated as a percentage of the 
price of cigarettes. Furthermore, although ad valorem excises have been recently criticized for 
their ineffectiveness in curbing smoking, due to the counter-effect produced by tobacco industry’s 
pricing (Gilmore et al. 2013, 1323-1324, Smith et al. 2011, 34-36), and although historically 
countries vary in their tax structure (Aspect 2004, 77), ad valorem taxes are still commonly used 
nowadays (Studlar, Christensen, and Sitasari 2011, 731, WHO 2010). In 2010, ad valorem excises 
varied from 23 per cent in Portugal to 57 per cent in Spain (WHO 2010). 12 
Second, the European Union has increasingly played a role in determining the tobacco tax structure 
of its member states. In 1992 two Council Directives (92/79/EEC and 95/59/EC) harmonized 
                                                          
11 For instance, in the UK in 2016 the ad valorem excise duty equals 16.5 per cent of the retail price and the specific one is £3.93 
on a packet of 20 cigarettes. 
12 Detailed information on each country’s tobacco tax structure can be found in Table 3 and Figure 5 the Annex of World Health 
Organization Technical Manual on Tobacco Tax Administration (WHO 2010). 
tobacco tax levels. 13 More specifically, they established a minimum rate of excise duties to be 
levied, but left countries free to set the balance between ad valorem and specific taxes and go 
beyond the minimum threshold. A series of amendments in following years culminated with the 
Council Directive 2011/64/EU, which clarified the exact composition of the minimum level of 
excise duties, in terms of specific and ad valorem duties. 14 Nonetheless, high variation is still 
present across European Union countries in the levels of these two types of excises. These 
directives also harmonized the way in which Member States calculate and report excise duty 
figures. As such, the analysis needs to take into consideration only those countries which are 
subject to European Union regulation. This also dictates that the period of analysis should start in 
1992. In conclusion, in this work I use the percentage in annual change in ad valorem excise duties 
on cigarettes (more specifically, on manufactured cigarettes) pooled across the European Union 
12 old Member States over time, from 1992 to 2013. 15 
Third, it might be argued that tobacco taxation has constantly increased in the last decades due to 
several reasons, such as the increasing attention to tobacco control across European countries and 
the European Union raising the minimum rate of duties to be levied by its members, and that these 
trends somehow bias the analysis. Yet, it should be noted that this is not necessarily true, as tobacco 
taxation is one of the areas where most action is still needed, also among developed countries 
                                                          
13 The influence of the European Union elicits some considerations on how policy diffusion affects policy dynamics and whether 
this creates some issues for the empirical analysis. As acknowledged by Jones and Baumgartner (2005) (p. 231) “heavy tails in 
frequency distributions can be caused by policy cascades”. With the term policy cascades, they broadly refer to policy diffusion. 
More specifically, they imply that positive feedback effects are caused by a combination of cognitive limitations of decision-makers 
and external shocks transmitted through policy diffusion. The presence of policy diffusion across EU Member States is in line with 
the punctuated equilibrium theory and hence does not bias results when using frequency distributions of policy change. 
14 In spite of the harmonization at European Union level, European countries tend to be clustered into ‘families’, with different 
approaches to tobacco taxation and tobacco control more in general (Cairney 2007, Cairney, Studlar, and Mamudu 2012). For 
instance, Continental and Anglo-Saxon countries tend to have higher levels of taxation than Mediterranean ones. 
15 These countries are: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
and United Kingdom. Author’s own data collection from various sources (CEC 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995b, a, 1998c, b, a, 
1999d, c, b, a, 2000c, b, a, 2001b, a, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012a, b, 2013). Imputation for 
missing data for two years was necessary. 
(WHO 2013, 79-80). Furthermore, these trends are present also in public budget, namely what 
Jones and Baumgartner (2005, 146-147) call incrementalism with upward drift, and they do not 
prevent the researcher from using annual percentage change distributions to study policy 
dynamics.  
Finally, in line with recent developments in the punctuated equilibrium theory literature, I use 
different types of policy commitments to measure punctuations. In so doing, I rely on a large 
dataset containing information on all tobacco control measures in four broad policy categories, 
namely advertising and sales restriction, education and environmental tobacco smoke regulation, 
adopted in 24 countries in the post-WWII period. 16 17 Advertisement and sales restriction refer 
respectively to those measures which prohibit tobacco advertisement and sponsorship of sports 
and cultural events and those measures which prevent selling tobacco products to minors, for 
instance. Education refers to regulation establishing health warning labels on tobacco products. 
Environmental tobacco smoke regulation refers to the regulation of smoking in work and public 
places, such as the smoking bans in the hospitality sector studied in this work. 
These policy instruments have historically been used by different countries with a different timing. 
Some countries have led the way, such as Nordic countries with the regulation of tobacco 
advertisement and the introduction of health warnings on tobacco products in the 1990s (Cairney, 
Studlar, and Mamudu 2012, 81) and Anglo-Saxon countries with the regulation of smoking in 
public places in the 2000s (Cairney, Studlar, and Mamudu 2012, 81). Nonetheless, the scope of 
tobacco control measures and their speed of introduction across countries have today reached 
unprecedented levels. In the course of a few years, most countries around the world have 
                                                          
16 For more information on the dataset, see Studlar (2006) and Cairney, Studlar, and Mamudu (2012).  
17 The countries are US, Canada, UK, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Finland, Israel, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Denmark, 
Spain, Belgium, Greece, Austria, Luxembourg, Iceland, Netherlands, Switzerland, Portugal and Sweden. 
established complex tobacco control regimes, characterised by a combination of these different 
policy instruments (Cairney, Studlar, and Mamudu 2012). 
FINDINGS 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the percentage in annual change in ad valorem excise duties on 
manufactured cigarettes pooled across the European Union 12 old Member States and over time, 
from 1992 to 2013. This distribution does not take the shape of a normal distribution but a 
leptokurtic distribution, characterised by heavy tails, suggesting the presence of a few outliers, 
which represent rare episodes of drastic policy change, and high frequency of median values, 
which represent recurrent episodes of policy inertia. Accordingly, policy change assumes a power 
distribution, suggesting that it is characterized by long periods of inertia disrupted by sudden 
drastic changes. The distribution in Figure 1 is very similar to the distribution of the percentage in 
annual change in budget expenditures across policy areas in the US (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, 
138) and in other countries, such as the UK (John and Margetts 2003, 421). 18 
Figure 2 shows the log-log plot of the same distribution of the previous figure, but it disaggregates 
this distribution into two sub-distributions: dots, which represent the right tail, and triangles, which 
represent the left tail, respectively the increases and the decreases in excise. It should be noted that, 
differently from the figure above, Figure 2 plots the logarithmic values on both axes, with the 
cumulative frequencies on the vertical axis. Increases in excise duties behave similarly to a Pareto 
distribution (which in turn is derived from an exponential distribution), as the dots in the log-log 
plot are located on a straight line. When plotted on a log-log graph Pareto distributions appear as 
straight lines, because the logarithmic function is the inverse function of the exponential function. 
                                                          
18 These results do not vary significantly when a country is left out from the analysis. 
Conversely, decreases do not lie on a straight line: this means that they assume a distribution more 
similar to a normal one. In conclusion, the degree of punctuations is higher in the increases in 
cigarette taxes than in the decreases, in line with the expectations from the public policy literature. 
The public policy literature uses the kurtosis of a distribution to measure its skewness, thus 
comparing this distribution with the normal distribution, which has kurtosis of 3 (and L-moments 
kurtosis of about 0.123). The most commonly used tests for normality, namely Skewness/Kurtosis, 
Shapiro-Wilk W and the Shapiro-Francia W', show that the pooled distribution and the two sub-
distributions for the positive and negative changes are significantly different from a normal 
distribution (with p<0.01). These distributions have kurtosis and L-moments kurtosis of 
respectively: 30.14 and 0.727 for the pooled distribution; 13.92 and 0.351 for the positive change 
distribution; 8.83 and 0.313 for the negative change distribution. These results also demonstrate 
that the distribution of negative changes is still leptokurtic, but closer to a normal distribution than 
the others. 
By relying on tobacco taxation as a measure of policy commitment to tobacco control, I 
demonstrated that tobacco control behaves like other policies. When the percentages in annual 
change are pooled together the result is a leptokurtic distribution, which suggests that tobacco 
control evolves through recurrent periods of inertia punctuated by rare periods of drastic change. 
Furthermore, by dividing this distribution into two sub-distributions representing positive and 
negative changes, I found that the former is more punctuated than the latter. In other words, 
positive changes (in this case increases in tobacco taxation) are more characterised by positive 
feedback effects, whereas negative changes are more characterised by negative feedback effects. 
Again, this is in line with what happens in other policies. 
This part tests whether punctuations are present also in other types of policy commitment than 
taxation. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the percentage in change in tobacco control regulation 
pooled across countries, years and policy areas. Differently from above, I do not use the annual 
percentage change, but the percentage change between those years in which at least one piece of 
legislation was enacted, as done in Baumgartner et al. (2009, 610). Similarly to tobacco taxation, 
this distribution does not take a bell shape and all the main tests for normality above show that this 
distribution is significantly different from a normal distribution (with p<0.01). Accordingly, I 
provide confirmation for the punctuation hypothesis also in different types of policy commitments 
other than taxation. 
The distribution of the percentage in change in tobacco control regulation has kurtosis and L-
moments kurtosis values respectively of 5.81 and 0.226, which are much lower than the values for 
the distribution of change in tobacco taxation and almost close to those of a normal distribution. 
These findings provide empirical evidence for the claim put forward by the friction model, namely 
that the degree of punctuations increases by moving down the policy cycle, because the role of 
frictions is stronger for outputs (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 615). Indeed, tobacco taxation is the 
result of a long and complicated decision-making process which involves different actors, similar 
to the one in place for budgetary expenditures. Conversely, the tobacco regulation in Figure 3 
comprises also laws and administrative decrees which are in turn more similar to what the literature 
calls policy processes, which are the results of more informal and straightforward process, where 
the role of frictions is in turn lower and punctuations are hence fewer.  
Further evidence for the argument that tobacco control behaves like other issues is shown in Figure 
4. This figure plots the same distribution as in Figure 3, but it divides it into different policy areas. 
The normality tests show that the distributions for the different policy areas are different from a 
normal distribution (with p<0.01). This is in line with what discussed above, namely that different 
types of policy change and commitment are subject to punctuations. Table 1 shows the kurtosis 
and L-moments kurtosis values for the distributions in the figure. Findings provide support for the 
claim that certain policy commitments are characterised by more punctuations as the role of 
institutional frictions is higher. Low kurtosis and L-moments kurtosis values are observed for sales 
and advertisement regulation, whereas ETS regulation and education have high values. This 
suggests that the former are closer to a normal distribution than the latter. The reason is presumably 
that ETS regulation and education are policy areas which comprise many types of policy 
instruments, but mostly highly conflictual legislation passed in the 2000s, such as smoking bans 
and provisions imposing health warnings on cigarette packs. These types of policy commitment 
are usually the result of a long and complicated process which requires coordination between 
different actors (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 615). As argued by the friction model, these types of 
policy commitment are more subject to institutional frictions and hence show higher levels of 
punctuations. Conversely, sales and advertisement regulation comprises also a series of voluntary 
agreements in place since the 1980s (which were then transposed into legislation decades later) 
through which the industry regulated itself on these matters. These types of policy commitment in 
turn do not require intense coordination across different actors and long and complicated 
processes. Accordingly, the difference across distributions are presumably due to the fact that self-
regulation, strongly used in advertisement and sales restriction, is the result of a more 
straightforward and informal decision-making process than legislation, which follows the formal 
process, which is in turn more subject to institutional frictions.  
The findings in Figure 4 and Table 1 provide some interesting and new insights on the evolution 
of tobacco control over time. In the 1980s, tobacco control concerned mainly sales and 
advertisement regulation, which took place in the form of voluntary agreements and soft 
legislation, where the role of institutional frictions is lower, according to the public policy literature 
(Baumgartner et al. 2009). Hence, during that time policy change in tobacco control was more 
‘punctuatedly’ gradual. Conversely, in the 1990s and 2000s the focus in tobacco control shifted to 
ETS regulation and education, mainly through tough legislation, such as advertisement and 
smoking bans. In this case, policy change started to be more ‘punctuatedly’ drastic. 
CONCLUSION 
This work finds that both tobacco taxation and other types of policy commitment, such as 
advertisement and smoking regulation, are characterised by punctuations. These findings suggest 
that tobacco control is characterised by periods of incremental change or inertia, related to negative 
feedback effects, punctuated by periods of drastic change, related to positive feedback effects. This 
work is the first large-N test of the punctuated equilibrium theory on tobacco control. Future 
research in this area should address some of the limitations in this study and, for instance, use data 
for a higher number of policy instruments and over a longer period of time, in order to extend the 
analysis and compare policy dynamics across countries. 
The findings above have interesting implications for the public policy literature more in general. 
First, they provide support for the punctuated equilibrium theory in a new empirical setting, 
namely taxation. Although the literature has so far focused on several types of policy commitment, 
such as budget output and legislation, taxation has received little attention. Second, the analysis 
on tobacco regulation in the second part provides further confirmation for the friction model. 
The findings in this study suggest practical implications for tobacco regulation. Today, the debate 
on tobacco control in the Western world revolves around plain packaging. The latter refers to the 
removal of branding from tobacco packaging and it represents the last frontier in the fight against 
smoking. Australia was the first country to introduce this measure in 2012, followed by others, 
such as the UK and Ireland. Yet, several countries are currently struggling to pass such legislation 
and those that have already done it already are facing delays in the implementation stage. These 
obstacles may be seen under the light of the processes uncovered in this study. Indeed, once the 
momentum for tough regulation passes and media and public attention shifts away, the punctuation 
seen above, it becomes harder and harder to regulate an area. 
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Figure 3 Distribution of the Percentage in Change in Tobacco Control Regulation (Pooled across 
Countries, Years and Policy Areas) 
 
  
Figure 4 Distribution of the Percentage in Change in Tobacco Control Regulation (Pooled across 
Countries and Years, by Policy Area) 
 
 
  
Table 1 Kurtosis and L-moments Kurtosis Values for the Distribution of the Percentage in Change 
in Tobacco Control Regulation (Pooled across Countries and Years, by Policy Area) 
Policy Area Kurtosis L-moments Kurtosis 
Sales 4.49 0.17 
Advertisement 4.36 0.14 
ETS 18.80 0.43 
Education 12.69 0.47 
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